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Abstract
According to the Lisbon Treaty the increasing cost of enforcing the Eu-
ropean border against immigration shall be shared among the EU mem-
bers. Nonetheless, the Treaty is rather vague with respect to the "ap-
propriate measures" to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden.
Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an
incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a contribution
game where a northern government and a southern government minimize
a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We con-
sider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that the
contribution of both governments is positive when their immigration tar-
gets are not too different. We show that total contribution is higher when
decisions are simultaneous, but the conditions for both contributions to
be positive are less restrictive in the sequential framework.
Jel Codes: D78, H72, H77
Keywords : Policy making, Government expenditures, Local govern-
ment expenditures, Federalism.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that immigration control in the EU suffers from a serious lack
of coordination (see Boeri and Bruecker, 2005). This should not be surprising
because by its very nature immigration is a supranational process, but its regula-
tion still concerns mainly the national governments. This is particularly evident
in the case of the EU where internal borders are not enforced in the Schengen
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for very helpful comments. Any error is ours.
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area, and spending on external border enforcement concerns especially Southern
European countries, who therefore provide a public good.
Northern members of the EU seem indeed reluctant to contribute to enforce
the border in the South (Wolff, 2008). Somewhat surprisingly, even the ongoing
emigration wave from Northern Africa is producing pressures to reintroduce
internal border checks rather than promoting a European immigration policy.1
The Lisbon Treaty defines external border enforcement as a "shared com-
petence", disciplined by the ordinary legislative procedure. In particular, "the
policies of the Union [...] and their implementation shall be governed by the
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial
implications, between the Member States" (article no. 80).
In spite of its importance, article no. 80 does not provide any rule on how to
share these costs in practice, though article no. 77 calls for the development of a
European border surveillance system (EUROSUR). The final implementation of
EUROSUR will represent a major financial effort for the EU budget (European
Commission, 2008b; Jeandesboz, 2008), but it seems quite likely that the current
fiscal crisis is going to delay its achievement for several years.2
Since there is no federal authority allowed to tax and redistribute in order
to fund a European immigration policy, the current state of the integration
process prevents the use of a mechanism able to redistribute resources from
northern countries to southern countries. For this reason, an approach based
on mechanism design (like the one proposed by Haake et al., 20103) seems not
practicable in the near future.4
On the contrary, it is necessary to restrict our attention to very simple
and viable institutional frameworks, where countries interact without a federal
immigration ministry.5 Contribution games provide the proper framework to
understand to what extent it is possible to obtain some sharing of the financial
burden for external border control in the present situation.
However, a distinctive feature of immigration policy is that each country has
its own optimal inflow: while immigrant workers are necessary to the economy,
their potential supply largely exceeds the demand of any national labour mar-
1 In April 2011 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlus-
coni sent a joint letter to the European Commission and the European Council, requesting
EU to "review the possibility of temporarily restoring controls at international borders" in
the Schengen area.
2So far, the main attempt to move immigration control to a supranational level has been
the establishment of the FRONTEX agency in 2005. The intent of FRONTEX is coordinating
national immigration policies at the European level.
3Haake et al. (2010) propose the adoption of the "expected externality mechanism", where
a supranational authority asks each country its own marginal willingness to pay for the public
good, then countries are taxed and provided with the public good according to the revealed
information. Unfortunately, this mechanism does not always satisfy the participation con-
straints.
4 In addition, mechanisms are especially used to deal with informational asymmetries (see
Clarke, 1971; Arrow, 1979; d’ Aspremont and Gerard-Varet, 1979) while our results are ob-
tained under perfect information.
5Mayr et al. (2009) move from the same concern, but in their model immigration external-
ities arise only after an immigration amnesty in a border country. In addition, they consider
only simultaneous decisions, and do not study a sequential budget process.
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ket. As a consequence, we introduce loss functions with respect to a national
immigration target in a contribution game.
Heterogeneity in national targets is crucial in our analysis, and we show
that, although information is complete and symmetric, it could easily prevent
cooperation. A conclusion is that imperfect information is not the main culprit
for the lack of a European immigration policy.
Our model includes a northern or central government (henceforth C ) and a
southern or local government (henceforth L). L shares its border with an emi-
gration country and must provide some border enforcement, while C does not.
C and L have different targets and different resources to control immigration.
Since our purpose is to check whether there exists an institutional frame-
work which dominates the others in terms of total contribution or incentive to
contribute, we compare simultaneous and sequential decisions. In the sequential
case we explore what happens when the leader is C or L.6
By confronting the alternative regimes we find that:
1) in order to obtain positive contributions, the immigration targets of C
and L must not be "too" different;
2) the admissible difference in the immigration targets is wider in the se-
quential game;
3) when both contributions are positive, total contribution is unambigously
higher in the simultaneous game (no matter who is the leader in the sequential
game);
4) in the sequential game the leader always contributes more than the fol-
lower;
5) in the simultaneous game a simple condition determines whether C or L
contributes more.
With respect to the possibility of a European immigration policy, we con-
clude that a simultaneous regime, in which northern countries decide jointly
with southern countries, produces tighter border enforcement but makes it more
likely that some countries do not contribute. On the other hand, the sequen-
tial regime provides an incentive to contribute at the cost of a smaller total
contribution.
The paper is organised as follows: the next section introduces our model,
Section 3 presents the results when decisions are sequential or simultaneous,
Section 4 studies the effect of the cost asymmetry on the equilibrium contribu-
tion, Section 5 is devoted to compare the equilibrium contributions under the
different institutional frameworks and Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our model must depict the basic issues related to the European immigration
policy we have discussed in the introduction. First of all, external border en-
6A great deal of literature studies joint provision of public goods within a sequential or si-
multaneous game (see for example Warr, 1982 and 1983; Cornes and Sandler, 1984; Bergstrom
et al., 1986; Varian, 1994).
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forcement is a public good, and there exists a conflict over its funding. At the
moment, no supranational authority can enforce a scheme of taxes and subsidies,
thus countries interact strategically with nobody being forced to contribute.
Finally, we assume that C and L face different costs in raising the resources
needed to curb immigration and that their preferences over the optimal inflows
are different.
In what follows, we develop the simple contribution game able to include all
of these points into our analysis.
2.1 Immigration control
Immigration control is an expensive activity which requires resources to enforce
the border, screen the immigrants, contrast illegal inflows and so on. A conve-
nient way to summarize these actions is describing immigration restriction as
an output produced through the resources C and L are willing to spend in order
to achieve their targets.
We define with gL and gC the contributions by L and C respectively. Let
M be the inflow of immigrants. Then, we can depict immigration restriction as
follows:
M = M¯ − d(gL + gC) 0 < d < 1; (1)
Where M¯ is the inflow into the federation in case of no restriction (gL =
gC = 0). This kind of production function fits the idea that the amount of
restriction is proportional to the resources used.7
2.2 Payoffs
As we pointed out in the introduction, the peculiarity of immigration policy is
the existence of a bliss point coinciding with the national optimal inflow. Thus,
we assume that each country has a quadratic loss function with respect to its
own target, and bears a quadratic cost to collect the resources needed to enforce
the border.8 As a consequence, we write the utilities as follows:
UC = −
1
2
(M −M∗C)
2
−
1
2
g2C (2)
UL = −
1
2
(M −M∗L)
2
−
π
2
g2L (3)
where π > 1 means that for L it is relatively costlier to gather the resources
needed to curb immigration. This assumption is used because C and L may
bear different costs to gather the same contribution, and it mirrors a situation
7Notice that setting the value of 0 < d < 1 gives a good approximation of a strictly concave
technology when we are in a sufficiently flat interval of the function.
8Gathering real resources always generates costs: they can be the political costs of raising
taxes, or even the opportunity costs of diverting funds from alternative projects.
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in which a small border country provides immigration restriction for the whole
federation.9
Finally, we assume M¯ > M∗C and M¯ > M
∗
L.
By substituting (1) into (2) and (3) we can rewrite the payoffs:
UC = −
1
2
(M¯ − d(gL + gC)−M
∗
C)
2
−
1
2
g2C (4)
UL = −
1
2
(M¯ − d(gL + gC)−M
∗
L)
2
−
π
2
g2L (5)
We are now going to solve the model under sequential and simultaneous
decisions.10
2.3 Results: sequential decisions
In the case of sequential decisions, both C and L could have the right to move
first. We are now going to explore both cases.
2.3.1 C moves first
Assume for the moment that C is the leader and L is the follower. We solve the
game by backwards induction. The best response of L to C is
g¯L =
d(M¯ −M∗L)− d
2gC
π + d2
(6)
The leader therefore has to solve the following problem:
max
gC
UC = −
1
2
[
M¯ − d
(
gC +
d(M¯ −M∗L)− d
2gC
π + d2
)
−M∗C
]2
−
1
2
g2C
which yields
g∗C =
∆C(π + d2)πd− πd3∆L
π2d2 + (π + d2)2
(7)
where ∆C ≡ (M¯ − M
∗
C), and ∆L ≡ (M¯ − M
∗
L) measure the desired entry
restriction.
9Consider for example the following figures: the aggregate GDP of Italy, Spain and Greece
in 2010 -possibly the Local government in our model- is 23.4% of the EU GDP. In contrast, the
aggregate GDP of France, Germany, Austria, Netherlands and the Nordic countries -possibly
the Central government- accounts for 49.5%. Hence, the fiscal base of C is wider than the
fiscal base of L.
10Since immigrants settle either in C or in L it may seem incorrect that M is the same in
both payoffs. However, for a single country, a national immigration target implies a federal
immigration target: suppose that C wants 100 immigrants. Suppose also that one half immi-
grants settle in C and one half immigrants settle in L. Then, M∗C = 200. In other words, M
∗
C
and M∗L can be interpreted as the optimal inflow for the federation from the point of view
of C and L respectively. Also note that this depicts quite well the ongoing conflict between
Italy, France and Germany over the responsibility for refugees from Northern Africa.
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By substituting (7) into (6) we get
g∗L =
∆L(π + d2 + πd2)d− πd3∆C
π2d2 + (π + d2)2
(8)
we therefore have obtained the equilibrium contributions of both players
when C moves first.
These contributions are positive under the following conditions:
g∗C > 0 for
∆C
∆L
>
d2
π + d2
(9)
g∗L > 0 for
∆C
∆L
<
π + d2 + πd2
πd2
(10)
Now we are going to present the results when L is the leader.
2.3.2 C moves second
When L moves first, the best response function of C is
g¯C =
d(M¯ −M∗C)− d
2gL
1 + d2
(11)
and the equilibrium contributions are
g∗∗C =
∆C(d
2 + π + πd2)d− d3∆L
d2 + π(1 + d2)2
(12)
g∗∗L =
∆L(1 + d2)d− d3∆C
d2 + π(1 + d2)2
. (13)
The conditions for having positive contributions are summarized below:
g∗∗C > 0 for
∆C
∆L
>
d2
d2 + π + πd2
(14)
g∗∗L > 0 for
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
. (15)
Finally, we are going to solve the simultaneous game.
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2.4 Results: simultaneous decisions
In a simultaneous game, the best response functions for C and L are, respec-
tively, (11) and (6), and the solutions are
g˜C =
∆C(π + d2)d− d3∆L
d2 + π + πd2
(16)
g˜L =
∆L(1 + d2)d− d3∆C
d2 + π + πd2
. (17)
These contributions are positive under the following conditions:
g˜C > 0 for
∆C
∆L
>
d2
d2 + π
(18)
g˜L > 0 for
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
(19)
By observing (7), (8), (12), (13), (16) and (17) it is evident that the equilibrium
contribution of each player is decreasing with respect to the desired immigration
restriction of the other player. In other words, in all cases the contribution of
C is decreasing with ∆L, and the contribution of L is decreasing with ∆C .
Intuitively, suppose that L prefers strict border enforcement and C is rela-
tively open. Then, the latter has an incentive to free ride, because L will provide
enough immigration control for both countries. This conveys the essential in-
sight that, in order for both countries to contribute, the national targets M∗C
andM∗L must not be too different. This result has crucial consequences that we
are going to discuss in the rest of the paper.
Before proceeding to compare the outcomes under the sequential and the
simultaneous regimes, it is indispensable to understand when both countries
decide to contribute.
3 Conditions for joint contribution
We know that individual equilibrium contributions are positive when conditions
(9), (10), (14), (15), (18) and (19) hold. Now we look at the conditions under
which both contributions are positive in the different games, which are summa-
rized in Figure 1. As we just argued, constraints on the admissible range of ∆C∆L
mean that the desired immigration restriction should not be "too" different.
By simple inspection of these conditions we can write the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1 (Conditions for positivity of both individual contributions): equi-
librium contributions are both positive if and only if the individual immigration
targets are not too different. The admissible difference is broader in the sequen-
tial game.
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Proof. See the appendix.
The proposition is crucial because it points out that in a sequential frame-
work the range of ∆C∆L under which there exists joint contribution is wider com-
pared to the simultaneous framework (see Figure 1). In this respect, our results
depart from Varian (1994), who argues that the sequential game can exacerbate
free riding problems: in Varian (1994) a leader with higher marginal utility from
the public good might be better off by not contributing and free riding on the
follower.
In our model this does not happen because we introduce a loss function in
a contribution game.
This implies that the leader does not contribute if and only if his desired im-
migration restriction is sufficiently low relative to the follower. When the leader
prefers high relative restriction, should he not contribute he would only suffer a
larger loss.11 Hence, the only way to exploit the leadership is trying to set the
contribution at a level that pushes the follower to add his own contribution.
4 The role of the cost asymmetry
In this section we report some comparative statics results with respect to the
effect of the cost asymmetry π.
In the Appendix we show that, quite intuitively, L reduces his equilibrium
contribution as π increases. On the other hand, the equilibrium contribution
of C increases with π in all cases, provided that both contributions are positive.
Results are summarized in the following table:
sequential
C leader L leader
∂g∗
C
∂π
> 0; ∂g
∗∗
C
∂π
> 0 for ∆C∆L <
1+d2
d2
∂g∗
L
∂π
< 0 ∂g
∗∗
L
∂π
< 0
simultaneous
∂g˜C
∂π
> 0 for ∆C∆L <
1+d2
d2
∂g˜L
∂π
< 0 for ∆C∆L <
1+d2
d2
The most important outcome of this comparative statics analysis is that
when both C and L contribute the timing of the game does not determine the
effect of π on the equilibrium contributions.
11To understand intuitively this point, consider an example: see Figure 1 and suppose that
C is the leader. Until ∆C
∆L
≤ d
2
d2+π
, he does not contribute because L is (relatively) so averse
to immigration that he provides enough restriction for C as well. When ∆C
∆L
> d
2
d2+π
, C is
better off by setting a positive contribution and, when ∆C
∆L
is very high, C provides enough
restriction for both players and L has no reason to contribute.
8
What matters is the decision to contribute: once C decides to put resources
in immigration control, he is going to increase his equilibrium contribution as L
faces higher costs in gathering his own contribution. To understand the reason
of this behaviour it is important to remember that this holds when both con-
tributions are positive, i.e. when the targets of C and L are sufficiently close.
In such a case, C finds it convenient to increase his equilibrium contribution in
order to compensate the disadvantage of L.
5 Sequential vs. simultaneous decisions
5.1 Total contribution
In this section we restrict our attention to the cases in which both contributions
are positive. By comparing the equilibrium solution in the three cases, it is
straightforward to conclude that total contribution is higher in the simultaneous
regime. This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Total contribution with simultaneous decisions): when both
contributions are positive, total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.
Proof. See the appendix.
The proposition simply states that the simultaneous game dominates the
sequential game in terms of total contribution -no matter who is the leader-.
Unlike proposition 1, this result is in line with Varian (1994), who shows that
in a game with complete information total contribution is never larger in the
sequential framework.12
Proposition 1 and proposition 2 convey our most important result, namely
that the simultaneous game increases total contribution, but it requires more
stringent conditions in order to get positive contributions from both players.
In other words, the simultaneous framework is successful in increasing total
contribution given that countries are willing to contribute, while the sequential
framework is successful in inducing contribution. It follows that the sequential
game should be recommended when the immigration targets of C and L are
very different and the main issue is to provide an incentive to contribute. This
seems to be the case of the EU, therefore an effort to frame a federal immigration
policy at the current stage of the European integration should favor a sequential
budget process.
In addition, we must stress that the simplest attempt to obtain some contri-
bution from a reluctant country is to make it act as a follower in the sequential
game. In fact, from Proposition 1 we know that the leader tries to set his own
contribution at a level that encourages the follower to contribute as well. This
widens the range of ∆C∆L allowing a positive contribution (see Figure 1).
12We also have (g∗C + g
∗
L) ≥ (g
∗∗
C + g
∗∗
L ) when
∆C
∆L
≤
π(1+d2)+d2(2+d2)
π(1+2d2)+d2(1+d2)
. There are no
particular reasons why this condition should hold, thus we conclude that it is not possible to
know a priori whether total contribution is higher when C or L is the leader. Note however
that the right-hand side is smaller than unity.
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5.2 Individual contribution
We now compare the individual contributions within the different regimes.
Again, we consider only the case of positive contributions.
Our first conclusion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium contributions in the sequential game): in the se-
quential game the leader contributes more than the follower.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result is important because it allows us to know unambigously the
player who provides the higher contribution.
The comparison of the individual contributions in the simultaneous game is
reported in the next proposition:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium contributions in the simultaneous game): in the
simultaneous game C contributes more than L if ∆C∆L >
1+2d2
π+2d2 and viceversa.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand intuitively the meaning of this proposition, suppose that costs
are symmetric, i.e. π = 1. In such a case, the condition ∆C∆L >
1+2d2
π+2d2 boils down
to ∆C > ∆L. Hence, when the cost of gathering the resources for immigration
control is the same, the country who desires more restriction contributes more.
When π is larger than unity this condition is relaxed: we have g˜C > g˜L if
∆C >
(
1+2d2
π+2d2
)
∆L, with
(
1+2d2
π+2d2
)
< 1.
In other words, C observes that L bears a higher cost, and, if π is sufficiently
high, C is going to contribute more than L even though ∆C < ∆L.13
This result is in contrast with the outcome of the sequential game, where
the leader always contributes more than the follower.
6 Conclusions
The simple model we have developed has several implications for framing a
European immigration policy.
The main insight of this paper is that Central governments and Local gov-
ernments contribute to fund immigration control only if their objectives are not
too different. Therefore, the real root of the coordination problem lies in the
heterogeneity of national immigration targets rather than in imperfect informa-
tion. This is even more worrying because it means that improving information
will not make cooperation easier.
On the other hand we notice that, once joint contribution is achieved, the
Central government compensates to some extent the possible lack of resources
13This outcome is consistent with the comparative statics results presented in the previous
section, where we have showed that when both contributions are positive ∂g˜C
∂π
> 0 and
∂g˜L
∂π
< 0.
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of the Local government. This holds for both a simultaneous and a sequential
framework.
Another important result is that total contribution is higher when decisions
are simultaneous but, unlike Varian (1994), achieving joint contribution is easier
in the sequential game.
It follows that, if the federation members are heterogeneous and the most
urgent issue is to avoid free riding, sequential decisions should be preferred at
the cost of a smaller total contribution. The latter case seems closer to the
current situation of the EU, thus a sequential budget process seems a promising
option to implement in some measure article no. 80 of the Lisbon Treaty in the
wait for a full-fledged European immigration authority.
In addition, it is interesting to note that in the sequential game the leader
contributes more than the follower, whereas in the simultaneous game C con-
tributes more than L when the cost disadvantage of the latter is sufficiently
high. Hence, in the sequential framework it is clearer who is going to put more
resources in immigration control.
11
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the simultaneous game both contributions are positive when
d2
π + d2
<
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
. (20)
In the sequential game when C is the leader both contributions are positive
when
d2
π + d2
<
∆C
∆L
<
d2 + π + πd2
d2
(21)
since 1+d
2
d2
< d
2+π+πd2
d2
, it follows that the interval of ∆C∆L under which both
contributions are positive is wider in the sequential game.
In the sequential game when L is the leader both contributions are positive
when
d2
d2 + π + πd2
<
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
(22)
since d
2
d2+π+πd2 <
d2
π+d2 , it follows that the interval of
∆C
∆L
under which both
contributions are positive is wider in the sequential game.
Proof of Proposition 2
We want to prove that total contribution in the simultaneous framework
(g˜C + g˜L) dominates total contribution in the sequential framework (g∗C + g
∗
L
and g∗∗C + g
∗∗
L ). Thus, we have to verify that
d(π∆C +∆L)
π + d2 + πd2︸ ︷︷ ︸
simultaneous
>
d(π2∆C +∆L(π + d
2))
π2d2 + (π + d2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
sequential, C leader
(23)
Condition (23) boils down to
∆C
∆L
>
d2
π + d2
.
When L is the leader we have.
d(π∆C +∆L)
π + d2 + πd2︸ ︷︷ ︸
simultaneous
>
d∆C(π + πd
2) + d∆L
d2 + π(1 + d2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
sequential, L leader
(24)
which boils down to
∆C
∆L
<
1 + d2
d2
.
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we conclude that total contribution in the simultaneous framework dominates
total contribution in the sequential framework when ∆C∆L >
d2
π+d2 (C leader) and
∆C
∆L
< 1+d
2
d2
(L leader). However, these conditions coincide with the values of
∆C
∆L
assuring the positivity of both contributions in the simultaneous framework.
Thus we conclude that when both contributions are positive, total contribution
in the simultaneous game dominates total contribution in the sequential game.
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to prove that the leader contributes more than the follower. When
C is the leader, the condition is g∗C ≥ g
∗
L, i.e.
∆C(π + d2)πd− πd3∆L
π2d2 + (π + d2)2
≥
∆L(π + d2 + πd2)d− πd3∆C
π2d2 + (π + d2)2
(25)
by rearranging condition (25) we obtain
∆C
∆L
≥
π + d2 + 2πd2
π + 2πd2
since
d2
π + d2
<
π + d2 + 2πd2
π + 2πd2
<
πd2 + d2 + π
πd2
we conclude that, when both contributions are positive, g∗C > g
∗
L.
When L is the leader, we have to check that g∗∗L ≥ g
∗∗
C , i.e.
∆L(1 + d2)d− d3∆C
d2 + π(1 + d2)2
≥
∆C(d2 + π + πd2)d− d3∆L
d2 + π(1 + d2)2
. (26)
By rearranging condition (26) we obtain
∆C
∆L
≤
1 + 2d2
π + πd2 + 2d2
;
since
d2
d2 + π + πd2
<
1 + 2d2
π + πd2 + 2d2
<
1 + d2
d2
we conclude that, when both contributions are positive, g∗∗L > g
∗∗
C .
Proof of Proposition 4
To compare the individual contributions in the simultaneous game, we simply
have to set g˜C ≥ g˜L, i.e.
∆C(π + d2)d− d3∆L
d2 + π + πd2
≥
∆L(1 + d2)d− d3∆C
d2 + π + πd2
. (27)
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By rearranging condition (27) we obtain
∆C
∆L
≥
π + 2d2
1 + 2d2
.
The effect of π
∂g˜C
∂π
=
d∆C(d
2 + π + πd2)− (1 + d2)(∆C(π + d
2)d− d3∆L)
(d2 + π + πd2)2
∂g˜L
∂π
=
d5∆C(d
2 + 2π) + 2d3π∆L(πd
2 + π + d2)
(d2 + π + πd2)2
proof that ∂g
∗
C
∂π
< 0 :
∂g∗L
∂π
< 0 for
∆C
∆L
≤
(π + d2 + πd2)2 − d6
π2d2(1 + d2)− d6
but for both contributions to be positive we need ∆C∆L ≤
(π+d2+πd2)
πd2
. Since
(π + d2 + πd2)
πd2
<
(π + d2 + πd2)2 − d6
π2d2(1 + d2)− d6
we conclude that
∂g∗
C
∂π
< 0 when both contributions are positive.
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